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Abstract
UML sequence diagrams are intuitively simple and can be understood by most stakeholders, including
end-users, decision makers, engineers and other parties involved in a risk analysis. Building on UML
sequence diagrams and trying to maintain their intuitive simplicity we propose a language for modeling
systems where the trust considerations of actors play a major role. Trust considerations are integrated with
behavioral descriptions in order to facilitate analysis of the trust considerations of the actors as well as
their resulting behavior. We claim that our language allows trust dependent behavior to be described at a
level of abstraction suitable for communication between diﬀerent groups of stakeholders in a risk analysis
situation. Furthermore, we argue that the increased expressiveness is required to facilitate the kind of
analysis necessary to properly weigh and treat trust dependent risk behavior.
Keywords: Trust modeling, risk analysis, sequence diagrams.
1 Introduction
In a potentially hostile environment such as the internet, an actor needs to decide
whether an entity can be trusted before engaging in any potentially harmful trans-
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action with the entity. When performing a risk analysis of a system where trust
considerations play a major role, the system model must include information on how
actors actually make decisions based on trust. This is illustrated by the example
below.
OldGoods is a company selling antiques. Their business is based on buying
old items such as furniture and watches on the internet and selling them from a
fashionable shop at a much higher price. To this end they have hired a purchaser
agent called Billy, whose job it is to search the internet for suitable items that can
be bought and then sold from the shop. Billy ﬁnds a lot of diﬀerent oﬀers from
various sites on the internet, and it is frequently required that the item is paid for
before it is received. In such cases he needs to decide whether to send the payment.
The decision, of course, depends on whether he trusts that the item will be shipped.
Business has not been good for OldGoods lately. A lot of money has been
lost paying for items that never arrived. The management therefore decides that
something has to be done. Someone suggests introducing one of the following two
policy rules for the purchaser agent:
(i) “Do not pay for an item until it is received.” This rule does not allow the
purchaser agents’ trust in the seller to play any role at all. It ensures that
money will not be lost paying for items that are not received. But it also
means that business opportunities are lost, since sellers (including the honest
ones) may not accept this condition. Hence, many items that might give a
good proﬁt can not be acquired.
(ii) “Do not pay for an item in advance unless you have talked to the seller on
the phone and feel conﬁdent that the item will be shipped as promised.” This
rule allows the purchaser agents’ trust in the seller to play a major role in the
decision. In order to make a decision the purchaser agent needs to estimate
the probability that the seller will actually ship the item and decide whether
this estimate amounts to feeling conﬁdent.
Should one of these rules be adopted? Or perhaps diﬀerent rules or other measures
would be better? These questions cannot be answered without a thorough under-
standing of the system. The ﬁrst rule could be a good choice if most honest sellers
were willing to ship items before they receive payment. The second rule may be
a good choice if the purchaser agent is able to give reasonably correct probability
estimates for the behavior of the sellers based on a phone conversation.
In this kind of risk analysis situation it may be necessary to interact with var-
ious stakeholders including end-users, decision makers as well as engineers. We
have positive experience with the use of UML sequence diagrams [12] for this pur-
pose [3],[16]. A UML sequence diagram is a speciﬁcation of how messages are sent
between entities to perform a task. Sequence diagrams seem to have the ability
to be understood by professionals of computer systems design as well as potential
end-users and stakeholders of the system in question, and are used in a number of
diﬀerent situations. They are used to get a better grip of an interaction scenario
for an individual designer or for a group that needs to achieve a common under-
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standing of the situation. Sequence diagrams are also used during more detailed
design considerations where the precise inter-process communication must be set
up according to formal protocols. Unlike for example state machines, sequence dia-
grams will typically not tell the complete story. There are normally other legal and
possible behaviors that are not contained within the diagrams.
The contribution of this paper is the extension of the UML sequence diagram
notation to allow trust dependent behavior to be described at the level of abstrac-
tion suitable for communication between diﬀerent groups of stakeholders in a risk
analysis situation. By trust dependent behavior we mean scenarios where an actor
makes a decision about how to behave depending on the degree of trust the actor
has in another entity. We claim that our language allows trust dependent behavior
to be described at a level of abstraction suitable for communication between diﬀer-
ent groups of stakeholders in a risk analysis situation. Furthermore, we argue that
the increased expressiveness is required to facilitate the kind of analysis necessary
to properly weigh and treat trust dependent risk behavior.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we state the re-
quirements to the modeling language. A brief introduction to a small subset of
UML sequence diagrams is given in Section 3. In Section 4 we extend the UML
sequence diagram notation with a construct for probabilistic choice. The deﬁnition
of trust on which we base our work is presented in Section 5. In Section 6 we extend
the UML sequence diagram notation further to capture trust-dependent behavior.
In Section 7 we illustrate the new possibilities for analysis facilitated through the
increased expressiveness. Some related work is presented in Section 8, before we
conclude in Section 9.
2 Requirements to the trust modeling language
The overall goal is to develop a language facilitating in-depth analysis of systems
whose critical behavior depends on trust, with the purpose of identifying vulnera-
bilities and treatments. A vulnerability in a trust-dependent system could typically
be a decision to engage in a potentially harmful transaction made by an actor based
on misplaced trust in another entity. During the analysis it should be possible to
identify such a decision as well as the trust consideration behind the decision. Fur-
thermore, it should be possible to quantify the likelihood of a harmful outcome.
This is necessary to decide whether a treatment must be found or not, and the kind
of treatment required.
A treatment in this context could typically be some kind of mechanism designed
to control, restrict and support trust dependent behavior, for example a trust policy.
Before deciding whether to implement a treatment it is necessary to assess its eﬀect
as well as cost.
Analysis requirements The language should facilitate analysis of
• systems whose critical behavior depends on trust;
• mechanisms designed to control, restrict and support trust dependent behavior.
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Billy:puAgent Sally:Seller
alt
sd enquiry
yes
forSale
[s=1]
[s=0]
no
Fig. 1. UML sequence diagram
In order to facilitate in-depth analysis, it is necessary that all relevant aspects of
the system can be expressed in the model. This includes the trust considerations
that inﬂuence the agents’ behavior as well as the behavior itself.
Expressiveness requirements It should be possible to
• express to what degree an agent trusts another agent with respect to a certain
transaction;
• express how trust considerations inﬂuence a choice made by an agent between
diﬀerent courses of action;
• describe the behavior of the actors and the interaction between the actors.
In order to perform a successful analysis of the system it is important to involve
various stakeholders such as end-users, decision makers and engineers. These groups
will typically have very diﬀerent backgrounds and levels of training, and the lan-
guage should be a tool for arriving at a joint and correct understanding of the
system (under the guidance of an analyst). Therefore the models expressed in the
language must be intuitive and easily understandable for the involved parties.
Comprehensiveness requirement
• The language should facilitate communication between end-users, decision mak-
ers and engineers by being intuitively understandable by all these groups.
3 UML sequence diagrams
The UML [12] is widely used in the computer and software industry, and is seen
as the de facto industry standard for system modeling. As explained above, UML
sequence diagrams are used to show how entities in a system interact. The entities
in question can be for example subsystems, components, pieces of software, or users.
Figure 1 shows a UML sequence diagram representing a simple interaction between
Billy and a seller called Sally. Each of these two entities is represented by a dashed
vertical line called a lifeline. The box at the top of the lifeline may contain the
name of the entity (before the colon) and its type (after the colon). Communication
between the lifelines is shown by messages. These are represented by arrows pointing
from the transmitter lifeline to the receiver lifeline, where the message content is
given by the name above the arrow. Each message deﬁnes two events: a transmit
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event occurring on the transmitter of the message and a receive event occurring
on the receiver of the message (at the arrow head). For each lifeline the events are
ordered in time from top to bottom. In addition, every message must be transmitted
before it is received.
The diagram enquiry in Figure 1 shows a scenario where Billy asks Sally
whether a certain item is for sale, as represented by the transmission of the “for-
Sale” message. This message is received by Sally. The alt operator shows that
there are then two possible alternatives (separated by the horizontal dashed line)
that may occur 4 : Either Sally transmits the “yes” message, which is then received
by Billy, or she transmits the “no” message, which is then received by Billy. The
Boolean expressions in square brackets at the beginning of the two operands of the
alt are called guards, and state conditions for the alternative to be chosen; Sally
will respond with the “yes” message if s = 1 and with the “no” message if s = 0.
4 Extending UML sequence diagrams with probabilis-
tic choice
STAIRS [6], [15], [14] gives a formal semantics for all the major operators of UML
sequence diagrams, as well as a reﬁnement calculus. Probabilistic STAIRS [13], [14]
extends STAIRS with an operator palt for probabilistic choice, as well as extending
the semantic model of STAIRS to include probabilities. For the purpose of this pa-
per, however, it is suﬃcient to keep the discussion at the syntactic level. Deﬁnitions
of formal semantics and reﬁnement relations can be found in the papers referenced
above.
We now introduce the probabilistic sequence diagram notation based on the
OldGoods example. To assess the current situation the management has obtained
a speciﬁcation that describes what happens in the current purchasing system after
a suitable item has been found by the purchaser agent. We may assume this spec-
iﬁcation is based on historical data, so that the probabilities in the speciﬁcation
reﬂect percentages of the observed behavior. The established practice is that the
purchaser agent asks the seller a test question on the phone before deciding whether
to send the payment. This is done in order to assess whether the seller will actually
send the item if she receives advance payment. If the purchaser agent is not happy
with the answer then advance payment will not be sent. The speciﬁcation pur-
chase in Figure 2 shows what takes place 5 . The purchaser agent starts by asking
the seller a question on the phone. After receiving the reply, he decides whether
to send advance payment or cancel the deal. The choice between these alternatives
is expressed by the palt operator (for probabilistic alternative), which has two or
more operands separated by a dotted line. Each operand expresses one possible
alternative. The lower operand of the outermost palt shows the alternative where
4 If using STAIRS we would have used the xalt operator instead of the alt. Since xalt is not part of the
UML we have chosen to use alt in the example.
5 Sequence diagrams allow speciﬁcation of both negative and positive behavior. Negative behavior is
behavior that the system is not allowed to produce. In order to get keep the diagrams simple we only
specify positive behavior in this paper. This is suﬃcient for our explanations at the intuitive level.
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Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.8} {0.2}
palt {0.6} {0.4}
sd purchase
pay
item
writeOff
cancel
question
reply
Fig. 2. The interaction between the purchaser agent and a seller expressed in probabilistic STAIRS
Billy cancels the deal after receiving the reply to his question. This alternative
has probability 0.4, which can be seen in the upper left part of the palt operand.
Probabilities are shown from left to right in the order of the operands, so the ﬁrst
(uppermost) operand of the outermost palt has probability 0.6, while the second
operand has probability 0.4.
If Billy chooses to send the payment then again one of two things may happen:
either the seller sends the item (with probability 0.8), or she does not (with proba-
bility 0.2). If she does not then Billy must write oﬀ the money, represented by the
message from Billy to himself.
Clearly, trust aﬀects the behavior of Billy. However, there is no explicit repre-
sentation of the way he makes his choice of behavior based on trust. Our objective
is to represent this explicitly in the speciﬁcation. But ﬁrst we need to deﬁne what
we mean by trust.
5 Trust
We use the deﬁnition of trust given in [11] 6 . This deﬁnition is an adaption from
[10], which is based on [4].
Deﬁnition 5.1 Trust is the subjective probability by which an actor, the trustor,
expects that another entity, the trustee, performs a given transaction on which its
welfare depends.
Thus deﬁned, trust is a belief of the trustor regarding the behavior of the trustee.
Since trust is a belief it is a subjective notion. An actor is an active entity which
has goals, intentions and capabilities. An actor may be an organization, a human
or an automated artefact such as hardware and software. Often a trustor will only
expect the trustee to perform a transaction if a certain scenario takes place. We
call this the antecedent scenario of the trust with respect to the transaction.
6 We have used the word ‘transaction’ instead of ‘transition’.
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TrustTrustor Trustee
Actor Entity
Antecedent
scenario
Transaction ŻperformsAsset
Fig. 3. Trust and related concepts
Figure 3 is a slightly simpliﬁed version of Figure 37 from [11] and shows the
relation between concepts of relevance to trust in the UML class diagram notation.
If the antecedent scenario takes place then the trustor trusts to some degree that the
trustee performs a certain transaction, i.e. the trustor believes that there is a certain
probability that the trustee will perform the transaction. An asset is something of
value to the owner (the trustor). That the welfare of the trustor depends on the
transaction is shown by the relationship between the transaction and the trustor’s
asset; the value of the asset depends on whether the transaction is performed.
The trustor is an actor, which is shown by the generalization relationship (open
arrowhead). The trustee may be any kind of entity, including an actor.
In our example Billy would be the trustor, while the seller would be the trustee.
The antecedent scenario would be that Billy sends advance payment after the phone
conversation, and the transaction would be that the seller sends the item after
receiving payment. If Billy believes that the probability that the seller will send
the item is 0.9, then this means that Billys trust in the seller with respect to this
transaction is 0.9. The asset in question would be the combination of the items
received by the purchaser agent and the money he has available for purchasing new
items. If an item is paid for, but not received, then this asset will decrease in value.
6 Extending UML sequence diagrams with a notion of
trust
In our example we need to know to what degree the purchaser agent trusts a seller
to send the item after receiving advance payment, i.e. the subjective probability
assigned to this outcome by the purchaser agent. We also need to know how this
trust inﬂuences his decision whether to send advance payment or not.
6.1 Subjective sequence diagrams
Since trust is deﬁned as a subjective probability for a certain alternative to occur,
we may express trust by a probabilistic sequence diagram simply by letting the
sequence diagram represent an agents’ subjective belief or estimate rather than an
objective description of the system. To show that a diagram is subjective we write
ssd (for subjective sequence diagram) in front of the diagram name instead of sd.
In addition, we write subj in the lifeline head of exactly one lifeline to show that this
is the subject, i.e. the lifeline whose subjective belief is captured by the diagram.
Subjective diagrams can only be composed if their subjects are identical.
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subj
Billy:puAgent
:Seller
palt {0.9} {0.1}
ssd est
pay
item
writeOff
Fig. 4. Billys trust in the seller with respect to sending the item after receiving advance payment
For example, assume that Billy after the phone conversation with the seller
believes the probability is 0.9 that she will send the item if he pays in advance.
This belief can be expressed by the speciﬁcation est (for estimate) in Figure 4.
With respect to the scenario described by est Billy believes that the probability
is 0.9 that the seller sends the item after receiving payment. He knows that if the
item is not received then he will write oﬀ the money; therefore he believes that the
probability is 0.1 that the money will be written oﬀ. The speciﬁcation does not say
anything about Billy’s belief about scenarios not described, such as payment not
being sent.
In order to express how Billy’s trust relates to the overall system behavior, we
need to show how the subjective diagram est representing Billy’s trust relates to
the objective diagram.
6.2 Including trust considerations in the system speciﬁcation
We are now in position to give a more detailed description of the system described
in Figure 2, where also relevant details concerning the purchaser agent’s trust are
expressed explicitly. Firstly, by using a subjective sequence diagram we may express
what probability estimate is made by the purchaser agent before he decides whether
to send advance payment or cancel the deal. Secondly, by the use of guards we may
express how this probability estimate determines his choice.
Figure 5 shows the system with explicit information about the trust consider-
ations made by Billy after a phone conversation with a seller. This speciﬁcation
does not represent one particular interaction occurrence with one particular seller;
instead it represents a general interaction where the objective probabilities would
typically be based on historical data. Since the subjective probability estimates
given by Billy varies from seller to seller, we use the variable x in the subjective
diagram instead of a constant. This variable can be used in the objective diagram
to show how the estimate determines Billy’s choice of whether to send advance pay-
ment. The notation (out x) after the diagram name in the subjective diagram is
used to declare that this variable can be referred to from an objective diagram. To
refer to the ﬁnal value of a variable v in a subjective diagram d from an objective
diagram we use the notation d.v, which means that est.x refers to the variable x in
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subj
Billy:puAgent
:Seller
palt {x} {1-x}
ssd est(out x)
pay
item
writeOff
Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.8} {0.2}
palt {0.6} {0.4}
sd purchase2
pay
item
writeOff
cancel
question
reply
[est.x0.5]
[est.x<0.5]
Fig. 5. A speciﬁcation showing how Billy makes his choice
the subjective diagram est at its point of termination. Hence, in cases where the
value of a variable v changes in the diagram d, the expression d.v will evaluate to
the ﬁnal value of v.
The variable x in the diagram est represents the estimated probability of re-
ceiving the item if sending advance payment according to Billy. The guards in the
operands of the outermost palt show that Billy will send advance payment only if
he believes that the probability of receiving the item is at least 0.5. The probability
of the operand where this holds (i.e. est.x ≥ 0.5) is 0.6. This means that in 60%
of the cases Billy believes that the probability of receiving the item is at least 0.5.
7 Analyzing systems with trust-dependent behavior
Figure 5 gives already a rough analysis of the current system. From this speciﬁcation
we see that Billy sends advance payment in 60% of the cases. Of these, the item
will be received in 80% of the cases. It follows that out of all the items considered,
48% will be paid for and received, while 12% will be paid for but not received. We
now demonstrate how models can be used in a more detailed analysis of a trust-
dependent system. We focus only on the issues speciﬁc for trust dependent systems:
subjective probability estimates and decisions based on such estimates.
From the speciﬁcation purchase2 in Figure 5 we see that the following two
components determines whether Billy will send advance payment to the seller:
• Billys probability estimate, and
• the threshold value of 0.5 that the estimated probability of receiving the item has
to meet for Billy to be willing to send the advance payment.
To evaluate the impact of subjective probability estimates, two questions need to
be answered. The ﬁrst is: How accurate are the estimates? We need to know this in
order to decide if it is acceptable to base decisions on the existing method of making
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estimates. If the subjective probability estimates are not suﬃciently close to the
objective probabilities, then either decisions should not be based on the subjective
estimates or some way of improving the accuracy of the estimates must be found.
The second question we need to answer is how the actor acts based on a prob-
ability estimate, or more speciﬁcally: Is the threshold right? A good probability
estimate is of little use if the actor engages in a potentially harmful transaction
despite his belief that the probability of being harmed is very high. On the other
hand, if the actor is not willing to engage in the transaction unless he believes that
the probability of being harmed is extremely low, then business opportunities may
be lost.
7.1 Assessing subjective probability estimates
In order to assess the accuracy of subjective probability estimates we need to know
the estimated probabilities as well as the objective probabilities for all cases. This
requires a description of the system that shows what will happen if the trustor
engages in the potentially harmful transaction no matter what his probability esti-
mate is; otherwise the objective probabilities for the case where the trustor decides
not to engage in the transaction could not be shown. Consider the speciﬁcation in
Figure 5. From this speciﬁcation we cannot tell what would be the probability of
receiving an item from those sellers that the purchaser agent believes are least likely
to send the item. Of course it may be that the probability of receiving items from
these sellers would actually be very high; they just have not been given the chance
to prove it.
Figure 6 shows a speciﬁcation from which we can evaluate Billy’s probability
estimates 7 . In Figure 6 it is assumed that Billy sends advance payment in all
cases. The speciﬁcation could for example be based on an experiment where Billy
actually accepts all oﬀers for a certain period of time, or possibly on some expert’s
judgment.
In addition to assuming that Billy always sends advance payment, we also distin-
guish between three diﬀerent intervals of estimated probability in Figure 6, instead
of just two as in Figure 5. For each interval we have a separate palt operand for the
case where Billy’s estimate lies within the interval. Thus the speciﬁcation shows
that the probability of receiving the item from a seller that Billy has estimated will
send the item with a probability in the interval [0.8, 1] is 0.9 (from pay1), while the
probability of receiving the item from a seller that Billy has estimated will send the
item with a probability in the interval [0.5, 0.8〉 is 0.75 (from pay2). From a seller
that Billy has estimated will send the item with a probability in the interval [0, 0.5〉
the probability is actually 0.6 (from pay3).
Splitting up the cases as in Figure 6 gives a better picture of how good Billy’s
estimates really are, and is useful as a means to identify the optimal threshold for
sending advance payment, as will be demonstrated below. We have chosen to use
7 The ref construct used in Figure 6 is a reference to the diagram whose name occurs inside the frame. Its
meaning is the same as if the contents of the referenced diagram was inserted in place of the ref construct.
The ref construct allows a modular presentation of diagrams, as well as reuse of diagrams.
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Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.2} {0.4} {0.4}
sd purchase3
ref pay1
[est.x0.8]
ref pay2
[0.8>est.x0.5]
[0.5>est.x]
Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.6} {0.4}
sd pay3
pay
item
writeOff
ref pay3
question
reply
Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.9} {0.1}
sd pay1
pay
item
writeOff
Billy:puAgent :Seller
palt {0.75} {0.25}
sd pay2
pay
item
writeOff
Fig. 6. A speciﬁcation from which we can evaluate the accuracy of Billy’s probability estimates
three diﬀerent cases in order to keep the speciﬁcation simple, but any ﬁnite number
of cases could of course be used, depending on the desired granularity of the analysis.
7.2 Finding the right threshold
We now explain how to identify the optimal threshold, against which Billy should
compare his estimated probability when deciding whether to send advance payment,
based on what we know about his subjective probability estimates as illustrated in
Figure 6. The desire to buy as many items as possible (since these will generate
income) must be balanced against the desire to minimize loss from items that are
paid for but not received. We therefore want to know how many items out of the
total number considered will be paid for and received, and how many will be paid
for but not received, depending on the chosen threshold. This information is easily
obtained from Figure 6. The table in Figure 7 shows the results. There is one
row for (the lower bound of) each of the three estimate intervals that has been
considered in Figure 6.
The Paid column shows the number of items that will be paid for if the cor-
responding guard (in the leftmost column) is used. Consider for example the row
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Guard Paid Received Lost
est.x ≥ 0.8 20% 18% 2%
est.x ≥ 0.5 60% 48% 12%
est.x ≥ 0 100% 72% 28%
Fig. 7. Results of using diﬀerent thresholds. All numbers are given as percentages of the total number of
items considered.
where the guard is est.x ≥ 0.5. From Figure 6 it is clear that the estimated prob-
ability is 0.8 or higher in 20% of the cases and between 0.5 and 0.8 in 40% of the
cases. Hence the estimated probability is 0.5 or higher in 60% of the cases.
The Received column shows the number of items that will be received if the cor-
responding guard is used. This number is found from the probabilities of the palt
operands where the guard is fulﬁlled, together with the probabilities of receiving
the item in these cases. Again consider the row where the guard is est.x ≥ 0.5,
which corresponds to the ﬁrst two operands of the palt operator in the purchase
speciﬁcation in Figure 6. The probability of the ﬁrst operand is 0.2, and the prob-
ability of receiving the item in this case (as shown by pay1) is 0.9. The probabil-
ity of the second operand is 0.4, and the probability of receiving the item in this
case (as shown by pay2) is 0.75. Hence, the number in the Received column is
0.2 ∗ 0.9 + 0.4 ∗ 0.75 = 0.48 = 48%.
The Lost column shows the number of items that are paid for but not received;
it is the diﬀerence between the paid items and the received items.
By combining the information from Figure 7 with information about how much
money will be lost or gained in the diﬀerent scenarios, the analysts have a good
basis from which to decide what is the best threshold to use 8 .
8 Related work
We are not aware of other languages where subjective probability estimates are
integrated in speciﬁcations of behavior along with objective probabilities. In the
literature there is, however, much work on uncertainty, belief and trust.
Subjective logic [7],[8] is a probabilistic logic that explicitly takes uncertainty
about probability values into account. The logic operates on subjective belief about
the world. Diﬀerent actors have diﬀerent subjective beliefs, and these beliefs are
associated with uncertainty. In subjective logic it is for example possible to calculate
to what degree an actor believes that a system will work based on the actor’s beliefs
about the subsystems, or to calculate the consensus opinion of a group of actors.
Subjective logic deals strictly with the actors’ beliefs and reasoning, and there is no
representation of how this reasoning inﬂuences their behavior.
In [9] it is shown how to use the belief calculus of subjective logic in a risk
8 As noted in Section 8, information about asset values could be integrated in our model by following the
approach of [1].
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analysis. Subjective beliefs about threats and vulnerabilities are used as input
parameters to the analysis. Hence, the computed risk assessments will also contain
information about the uncertainty associated with the result of the analysis.
Epistemic logics are modal logics concerned with reasoning about belief. A
modal belief-operator is used to express statements like “actor A believes P”. BAN
logic [2] is an epistemic logic for analyzing communication protocols and authentica-
tion. The belief operator can be used for example to express that two actors believes
that they are indeed communicating with each other (and not with an intruder).
A formal framework for modeling and analyzing security and trust requirements
is presented in [5]. Focus is on modeling organizations (which may include computer
systems). The approach is based on a separation of functional dependencies, trust
and delegation relationships, which allows security and trust requirements to be
captured without going into details about how these will be realized. The formal
framework supports automatic veriﬁcation of security and trust requirements.
In [1] a semantic paradigm for component-based speciﬁcation supporting the
documentation of security risk behavior is proposed. Probabilistic sequence dia-
grams are used to express the probability of unwanted scenarios. Assets and their
values are modeled explicitly as lifelines that receives messages when their value
changes. Alternatively, assets could have been represented by variables that are
assigned new values as the asset value changes. Explicit representation of assets
(either as lifelines or variables) can also be included in our models in the same way;
this will be highly useful for example when evaluating the cost and beneﬁt of a
treatment.
9 Conclusion
We have presented a language designed to support risk analysis of trust-dependent
systems. In Section 2 we stated the requirements that such a language should fulﬁll.
We now argue that these requirements have been fulﬁlled
Analysis requirements
• The language facilitates analysis of systems whose critical behavior depends
on trust by oﬀering models where trust considerations (subjective probability
estimates) and decisions based on trust considerations are modeled explicitly
along with system behavior. Trust considerations are represented by subjective
sequence diagrams, while decisions based on trust are represented by guards
referring to subjective sequence diagrams. This makes it easy to recognize trust
considerations and decisions based on trust considerations in a model. Hence it
is easier to identify vulnerabilities and treatments related to such considerations
and decisions, and to ﬁnd treatments.
• Analysis of mechanisms designed to control, restrict and support trust depen-
dent behavior is facilitated since models can be built of systems where such
mechanisms are (assumed to be) implemented. We may then obtain two mod-
els of the same system: one where the mechanism is implemented and one
where it is not implemented. The eﬀect of the mechanism can be evaluated by
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comparing probabilities for desired and undesired outcomes in the two models.
Expressiveness requirements
• To what degree an agent trusts another agent with respect to a certain trans-
action can be expressed by probabilities in a subjective sequence diagram.
• How trust considerations inﬂuence a choice made by an agent between diﬀerent
courses of action can be expressed by a guard referring to a subjective sequence
diagram.
• The behavior of the actors and the interaction between them can be expressed
by an objective sequence diagram.
Comprehensiveness requirement
• We have positive experience from using sequence diagrams to facilitate commu-
nication between end-users, decision makers and engineers during risk analysis
[3],[16]. The language presented in this paper is a conservative extension of
UML sequence diagrams where only a few new constructs (probability on alter-
natives and subjective diagrams) have been added. We therefore have strong
reason to believe that also our language will facilitate communication and be
intuitively understandable by the persons taking part in the analysis.
As future work we intend to add the possibility to express an actor’s uncertainty
about his subjective probability estimates. When giving an estimate, an actor may
be more or less certain that the estimate is correct. This could be modeled as a
second-order subjective probability, where the value 1 means that the actor is certain
that the estimate is correct. Such second-order probabilities could be assigned either
for each subjective diagram or for each palt operator in a subjective diagram, and
these probabilities could be referred to in guards along with the ﬁrst-order subjective
probabilities. Hence we may express statements such as “the purchaser agent will
not send advance payment unless he believes that the probability of receiving the
item is at least 0.5 and he believes that his estimate is correct with a probability of
at least 0.9”.
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